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Evaluating Realist Evaluation: A response to Pawson’s reply  
 
I am very grateful for this opportunity to respond to Ray Pawson’s (2016a) 
reply to my immanent critique of realist evaluation (Porter 2015a). To aid 
comparison, my response follows the headings and structure of Pawson’s 
reply. 
 
Let me start on a positive note of unambiguous agreement. I entirely concur 
with Pawson’s position in the first section of his reply that research 
methodology involves a reciprocal relationship between principles and 
practice. However ( 
 
The main thrust of his argument in this section involves an attempt to contrast 
the grounded methodologist rooted in the practicalities of research (Pawson) 
with the rootless theorist obsessed with disconnected doctrines (Porter). 
Unsurprisingly, I do not accept this characterisation. 
 
As a general observation, all research, whether explicitly or implicitly, is 
founded on ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions. If those 
assumptions are confused or contradictory, then this is likely to have 
deleterious consequences for the practical conduct of research. Theoretical 
efforts to clear confusions and contradictions are therefore a legitimate 
component of the research process. 
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More specifically, while I respect Pawson’s aspiration to drive realism into 
research practice (Pawson and Tilley, 1997), in his efforts to do so he has 
never shied away from pontificating on matters philosophical. I assume this is 
because he accepts that Realist Evaluation (RE) requires a cogent theoretical 
foundation. But whatever his motivation, the fact remains that he has 
frequently presented readers with ontological, epistemological and axiological 
arguments, so he can hardly complain when they are subjected to scrutiny. 
 
Conversely, his assertion that ‘not a jot, not an iota of the empirical work is 
discernable within Porter’s fragmentary “deconstructions”’ (134) is simply 
false. Each of the three main sections of my paper includes an illustrative 
discussion of empirical RE that I have engaged in. His accusation that my 
critique fails to interweave principle and practice has no merit.  
 
Pawson’s attempt to rule my arguments out of court because of the terrain I 
place them on is a dangerous ploy. As he observes, ‘an obstinate method 
which fails to learn will ossify or die’ (133). May I suggest that, in his 
reluctance to countenance critical analysis of RE because it addresses 
ontological and axiological issues, it is Pawson rather than me who is 
displaying obstinacy? As will be seen, his distain for my supposed pretence to 
philosophical perfection, combined with his persistent tendency to use 
argumentative gambits of dubious pertinence, means that he rarely engages 
directly with the substance of my arguments. This is unfortunate because it is 
through such engagement that we can all learn. 
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Instrumentalism? 
This section begins with Pawson complaining that in citing his use of the 
value-laden terms ‘poor performance’ and ‘inappropriate behaviour’ in his 
explanation of the origins of interventions, I ‘do not even bother to mention 
that the research in question [from whence he states these terms are taken] is 
a review of so-called naming-and-shaming programmes’ (134). The reason 
why I didn’t mention it is not because I couldn’t be bothered but because there 
is absolutely no indication in his text that this is the origin of his statement, not 
even a citation. All there is is a bald didactic pronouncement that I treated as 
such.  
 
In response, he argues that the use of ostensive definition in his invisible 
review means that my ‘stricture on conceptual exactitude misses the point’ 
(134). I have no idea what stricture on conceptual exactitude he is talking 
about. I wasn’t concerned with the exactness or otherwise of these concepts. 
What interested me was their expression of values and how researchers 
might choose to approach those values. 
 
He goes on to provide a clear explanation of the contingencies that 
characterise the causal chains involved in policy initiatives, concluding that 
‘outcomes, by and large, are at variance with policy expectation. In short there 
are no givens here’ (134). I am happy to acknowledge the important insight 
that the outcomes resulting from interventions should never be taken as 
givens, but those were not the ‘givens’ that my argument related to. Instead, I 
was pointing to the danger of researchers taking the value judgements of 
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policy makers (‘poor performance’, ‘inappropriate behaviour’) as givens, and 
therefore not subjecting them to critical analysis. While internally cogent, his 
argument is beside the point. 
 
 
Facts? 
Pawson takes me to task for suggesting an affinity between his position and 
Weber’s (1949) notion of social scientific value freedom ‘whereby the scientist 
is mandated to take an objective, value-neutral approach to her subjects’ 
(Porter 2015a: 248). Pawson counters this by pointing out that he has never 
cited and does not accept Weber’s views on objectivity. But I didn’t assert that 
he accepted Weber’s position, simply that there was an affinity between the 
two positions. What is odd is that Pawson then goes on to confirm that affinity: 
‘As a matter of fact, I do believe that research should cherish the aspiration to 
be objective’ (135). 
 
It gets odder. In support of his contention that ‘objectivity does not reside in 
the search for facts’ (135), he uses an example that assumes three facts:  
 
A job creation scheme may be regarded as a ‘success’ as measured 
by significant recruitment from the unemployed, or as a ‘failure’ 
because the jobs created are largely part-time and short-term (135). 
 
That jobs are created and that most of them are part-time and short-term are 
all presented as empirically established facts. Of course, the quotation also 
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indicates that their interpretation can differ widely. That’s why the remit of 
social science includes both measurement and interpretation, and why any 
claim to explanatory power has to take account of both. Given these truisms, 
it is perplexing that Pawson has committed himself to this self-contradiction, 
whereby on the one hand he discounts facts, and on the other he counts 
them.  
 
Taking a more sensible tack, he continues by noting that observation is 
always theory-laden (though not determined by theory); that data always 
require interpretation; and that the pursuit of objectivity is a social process 
(Pawson’s preferred process being one that relies on the distinctly 
Machiavellian attributes of distrust combined with ambition). His argument is 
that had I been sufficiently well-read to be aware of these points, I would not 
have accused him of having an affinity with Weber. But this contention 
depends on the oxymoronic assumption that the founder of interpretive 
sociology didn’t accept that observation is theory-laden, or that data require 
interpretation, or that science is a social activity. It falls on all three counts. 
 
Values? 
Pawson starts this section with a vigorous condemnation of emancipatory 
approaches which he characterises as deciding a priori what the world ought 
to be and then criticising those who depart from this view as deceitful. He 
uses Bhaskar’s (1979) adoption of the Marxist concept of false consciousness 
as an alleged example of this.  
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I happen to agree with Bhaskar’s emancipatory approach, and elsewhere 
have explained why (Porter, 2015b). However, I didn’t make any such 
argument in my immanent critique. Being obliged to use my limited wordage 
here to deal with at least vaguely pertinent issues, I do not have the space to 
tackle this red herring comprehensively. This is unfortunate because Pawson 
(2016b) made the same argument in his reply to my paper defending critical 
realism (2015b), to which, despite requests to the editor of Evaluation, I have 
not been afforded the opportunity to respond. I mention this so that readers 
can appreciate that my silence in that journal is not because I have no 
arguments to make, but because I have not been allowed to make them.  
 
The only comment on this distraction that I have room to make here is to 
scotch Pawson’s implication that I regard those engaging in RE research as 
somehow duplicitous (that would be hypocritical to say the least, given that I 
have engaged in RE myself). My concern is that if an evaluation method does 
not include a critical stance towards the values of policy makers, there is a 
danger that, depending on those values and the outcomes of the interventions 
based on them, there may be negative consequences for people that are not 
picked up by the evaluators. Indeed, as I pointed out in one of my (non-
existent, according to Pawson) empirical examples, I have fallen into this trap 
in my time.  
 
The values argument in my immanent critique was based not on Bhaskar, but 
on Andrew Sayer’s (2011) thesis that all of us have concerns about our 
flourishing or suffering. These concerns result from a combination of 
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observation, reasoning and values. Sayer argues that factual statements that 
describe objective needs or lacks inherently contain the inference that there is 
merit in responding to alleviate them. I also included Sayer’s qualification that 
this process does not automatically mandate a particular response. Pawson 
takes this qualification, quotes it at length, and presents it as my prime 
argument, thus relieving himself of the obligation to confront the main issue. 
 
He moves on to provide an example of how RE deals with values – his review 
of Megan’s Law. He tells us two things about the outworking of that law. First, 
that it resulted in unintended consequences that varied according to the 
contexts into which it was introduced. Second, that different people viewed it 
in different ways. We have been here before, so I will repeat my acceptance 
that causation is rarely linear and subjective perspectives rarely homogenous. 
But once again, I have to question the pertinence of these insights.  
 
Because things are complicated and subject to disagreement, we have to be 
very careful about how we respond to them, hence my inclusion of Sayer’s 
codicil. However, the fact that life is complicated does not warrant us ignoring 
avoidable suffering, hence my inclusion of Sayer’s main argument. Pawson’s 
identification of complexity and perspectival interpretation does not directly 
address the issue of researchers’ values, and does not amount to a good 
reason for abandoning evaluators’ responsibilities to take people’s concerns 
into account. 
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Maybe being a nursing scholar adds to the degree to which I am sensitised to 
this issue, in that a pretty much universally shared assumption in nursing 
research and practice is that the avoidance of avoidable suffering of patients 
is a paramount value position. In other human sciences, matters may be less 
clear-cut, but that does not obviate the need to address the same principles.  
 
Change? 
Pawson charges me with misrepresenting him by asserting that RE elides 
social structure and agency in a manner that is similar to, and therefore 
shares similar problems with, Anthony Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory. I 
do not accept the charge of misrepresentation. As evidence, I will cite seven 
lines of Pawson and Tilley’s Realistic Evaluation (1997) which contain no less 
than three elisions of structure and agency under the rubric of social 
mechanisms, each one italicised by the authors to emphasise their 
importance. Had space allowed, I could have included a further three 
examples from the same page, as well as direct approbation of the 
structurationist model elsewhere in their book (1997:56). 
 
Social mechanisms are thus about people’s choices and the capacities 
they derive from group membership. We find the same combination of 
agency and structure employed generally across sociological 
explanation and we thus suppose that the evaluation of social 
programs will deploy identical explanatory forms, reaching ‘down’ to the 
layers of individual reasoning ( and ‘up’ to the collective resources on 
offer (1997:66). 
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Moving on, I am gratified that Pawson commends my modification of the CMO 
causal configuration as potentially valuable, and hope that it lives up to that 
potential. However, he attaches three reservations to his commendation. The 
first is that some of my proposals are already contained in his model. In 
particular, he states that in the RE model ‘it is abundantly clear that contexts 
(C) not only pre-exist interventions but they also have causal powers’ (137). In 
places it is indeed clear, and I pointed this out in my paper. My problem with 
RE is that in other places a very different conception of contexts is posited, 
which sees them as passive sets of circumstances rather than combinations 
of causal mechanisms. It is this contradiction that led me to propose the less 
ambiguous category of contextual mechanisms (CM). 
 
I concur with Pawson’s second reservation that using formulae runs the risk of 
encouraging overly mechanical interpretations. My excuse for doing so is that 
I was responding to the pre-existing categorical construct of context + 
mechanism = outcome which, for good or ill, has become the signature motif 
of RE.  
 
His third reservation is based on the observation that the evaluator’s task is to 
address the particular dynamics of the specific social situation being 
researched, a task that requires flexibility and imagination. I agree. But he 
then states that ‘no amount of conceptual musing can help in this, the vital 
task’ (137). The smokescreen of sarcasm that follows this statement fails to 
hide its weakness. If he had said that no amount of conceptual musing can 
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replace this vital task, I would wholeheartedly agree with him. But I simply 
cannot accept that researchers, in their efforts to get to grips with concrete 
instances of the social world, can gain nothing from an appreciation of the 
kinds of processes they are addressing, the kinds of knowledge that can be 
gained about them, the best approaches to gain that knowledge, or indeed the 
purpose and consequences of their investigations. The upshot of taking 
Pawson’s position seriously would be, at best, a radically abstracted 
empiricism (cf. Mills, 1959). Nor can I understand why a man who has spent a 
goodly part of his professional life musing on concepts such as contexts, 
mechanisms and outcomes with a view to helping researchers should 
undermine his own raison d’être in such a cavalier fashion.  
 
But, according to Pawson, my sins are greater still. Not only do I muse on 
these unhelpful concepts, I also believe in their sanctity. At this point, I have to 
say that I am tiring of Pawson’s ad hominem obfuscation, so let me make my 
position clear. What we have in RE is a methodological strategy for evaluation 
research that is backed up by ontological, epistemological and axiological 
positions. I believe that there are problems with some of those positions, and 
that some of those problems have posed difficulties for researchers. In my 
paper, I pointed them out, gave reasons why I thought they were problematic, 
and provided alternatives that I hoped would help resolve them. That’s it and 
that’s all. It isn’t about ‘metaphysical ordinances’ (133); it isn’t about 
Pecksniffian philosophy (134); it isn’t about ‘conceptual sanctity’ (137); and, to 
anticipate his accusation in the next section, it isn’t about ‘slaying all 
philosophical opposition to perfect an ontology and epistemology’ (138). It is 
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simply a debate about the relative merits of two realist approaches to 
evaluation research; a debate that I had hoped would be conducted according 
to pertinent logic and evidence rather than circumvention and hyperbole. 
 
Realism? 
A large proportion of this section involves Pawson listing off a considerable 
number of the various realisms that are out there, and then criticising me for 
not including them in my discussion. In response, I wish to repeat that my 
interpretation of this dialogue is that it is about the relative merits of two 
approaches to realist research – Pawson’s and mine. If this is so, nothing 
would be gained from pouring the likes of Platonic or Scottish Common Sense 
Realism into the mix. I am happy to accept that Pawson came to his approach 
through a process of erudite eclecticism that fused various strands of realism 
into the RE version. But it is the product of that fusion that I am addressing, 
not its antecedence. I therefore make no apology for not mentioning a 
‘panoply of realisms’ (138) in my account. Nor do I apologise for uncovering 
the specific confusions and contradictions embedded in the RE approach.  
 
In Pawson’s final remarks, we are back once again to the parodic contrast 
between his pragmatism and my absolutism. I concur with his observation 
that: 
 
Wise researchers begin with a broad attachment to a paradigm, select a 
subset of protocols most pertinent to the scope of their enquiry and then 
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translate them into a research design to fit the problem under investigation 
(Pawson, 2016a: 138-9). 
 
But once again, I have to object to his caricature of my supposedly contrary 
position. This time his accusation is that, in contrast to the sensible and 
modest approach quoted above, my quest is for ‘realist purity’ (139). Let me 
repeat, I have no interest in the patently futile task of trying to create some 
sort of metatheoretical apotheosis from which no deviation is permitted and 
beyond which no improvement is required. Like Pawson, I accept that 
researchers have to cut their methodological coat according to their 
investigative cloth; like Pawson, I take epistemological labour to be 
evolutionary. I locate this dialogue in that evolutionary process. 
 
The important issue is not my irritation with the accusation that I hold a 
ridiculous belief in the incorrigibility of a social theory, but that acceptance of 
such an accusation closes down the debate. In contrast, I want to keep the 
debate open, and recognise the importance of others interrogating my claims 
to test the degree to which they are sustainable. I can think of at least four 
important questions that might be asked: To what extent are my claims about 
the inconsistencies and contradictions of the RE model justified? If there are 
inconsistencies, is there a risk that they will have a detrimental effect on the 
prosecution of practical research? Are the alternatives I pose likely to improve 
matters? Are there better ways to deal with the issues I raise?  On the 
answers to these questions my arguments stand or fall. 
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My disappointment with Pawson’s reply is that, for the most part, he chose not 
to take this sort of approach. Rather than concentrating directly on the merits 
or demerits of my arguments, he decided to take the route of diversion, 
conjecture and disparaging imputation. In turn, rather than getting to the nub 
of the matter, I have had to use my response to point out the diversions, 
refute the conjectures and rebuff the disparagements. Pawson’s avoidance of 
issues of substance means that the dialogue between us hasn’t really moved 
the debate on very much. Unless, that is, we make the reasonable inference 
that his substantive silence gives grudging consent. 
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